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Abstract
Fixed-price and time-and-materials contracts are
commonly-used contract forms by clients in software
outsourcing. The two parties, client and provider, usually renegotiate the testing time after system development occurs. This research investigates the impacts of
such renegotiation on the client’s contract choice. Our
analysis shows that under both contract forms, renegotiation can incentivize the provider’s effort, and this
effect becomes more influential when the provider has
higher bargaining power. Compared with a fixedprice contract, a time-and-materials contract can
stimulate the provider’s effort based on the terms for
monitoring and reimbursement. The results suggest
that when the provider has high bargaining power, the
client will prefer a fixed-price contract. But when the
provider has low bargaining power and the cost of
monitoring is low, the client will prefer a time-andmaterials contract. When the provider has low bargaining power and the cost of monitoring is high
though, the client will prefer a fixed-price contract.

1. Introduction
Software outsourcing has experienced tremendous
growth over the last two decades [21] and Technavio’s
analysts forecast the global IT outsourcing market to
grow at a compound annual rate of 5.84% from 2014
to 2019 [28]. In 2016, 951 software outsourcing contracts worth USD 102.4 billion were signed worldwide
[18]. In practice, the software outsourcing process is
comprised of three stages: development, testing and
maintenance. Practitioners recognize that software
outsourcing consists of various uncertainties, such as
the volatility of software code [19] and the transformation of IT landscape [24].
In software outsourcing, two kinds of contracts are
commonly used between the client and the provider:
fixed-price contracts and time-and-materials contracts
[13]. A fixed-price contract consists of a predetermined payment for system development, testing and
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maintenance services from the provider. Besides payment for the services of the provider, time-and-materials contracts include an extra fee for the provider’s
effort, especially in system development. Due to the
unobservability and non-contractibility of effort, in a
time-and-materials contract, the client needs to monitor the provider’s effort to determine the appropriate
compensation for what it has done.
Apart from contracts to activate the outsourcing
process, due to the associated uncertainties, we also
observe that the two parties usually renegotiate the
system testing time after system development. For example, the Kansas Department of Health and Environment signed a fixed-price contract with Accenture, and
after the system was developed, they extended the contract for five years to test and debug the system [22].
Also, the British Columbia, Canada. Ministry of
Health signed a time-and-materials contract with IBM
and revised the contractual terms around timeline and
defect remediation, requiring IBM to resolve system
bugs during testing.
Renegotiation of testing time not only addresses
the uncertainties in system development, but also affects the provider’s development effort since testing
time is mainly determined by the quality of the effort.
Further, testing time is also a vital decision in software
outsourcing to balance the trade-off between testing
and maintenance costs after the system has been developed. If testing time is short, many critical bugs
may remain undiscovered, which results in high
maintenance cost, but prolonged testing leads to the
delays in system release, which is costly as well. Observers suggest that in the fast-evolving IT market, a
fixed-price contract with renegotiation is more appropriate [23]. However, nobody likes to renegotiate a
contract with a provider [26] and so time-and-materials contracts have become popular because they reduce the possibility of renegotiation [17].
The above facts in software outsourcing pose interesting challenges for the client: Which contract
form should be chosen when the client renegotiates
with the provider on testing time after system development? To address the above question, we set up a
multi-stage model in which a client outsources a cus-
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tomized information system from an IT service provider. We examine two contract types – a fixed-price
contract and a time-and-materials contract – and focus
on the impacts of testing time renegotiation on the client’s preference.
Our analysis will show that, compared with a
fixed-price contract, a time-and-materials contract can
stimulate the provider’s effort through monitoring. For
these two contract types, renegotiation can incentivize
the provider’s effort, and as the provider’s bargaining
power in renegotiation increases, the latter is more
willing to exert effort. When the provider has high bargaining power, renegotiation incentivizes the provider
and the client will prefer a fixed-price contract. When
the provider has low bargaining power and the per unit
cost of monitoring is low though, the client will use
monitoring as a complement to stimulate the provider
and select a time-and-materials contract. When the
provider has low bargaining power and the per unit
cost of monitoring is high, renegotiation will lead to
high monitoring cost, which reduces the client’s profit
in a time-and-materials contract. So a client will be
better off choosing a fixed-price contract.
Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3
describes the model settings. Section 4 examines
fixed-price contract and time-and-materials contract
respectively. Section 5 analyzes the client’s contract
choice. Section 6 summarizes the findings and discusses modeling limitations and further research.

2. Literature Review
There has been increasing interest on software and
IT outsourcing contracts in the IS literature. Dey et al.
[10] and Cezar et al. [6] presented contract-theoretic
models to analyze how to motivate the effort from provider(s). Lee et al. [20] examined the contract performance when both the client and the provider make efforts toward a common IT system. In addition, fixedprice and time-and-materials contracts are two typical
software outsourcing arrangements. Previous research
compares the differences between the two contracts in
transaction costs [3, 8] and incentive mechanisms [13].
However, almost all the analyses mentioned above
viewed software outsourcing contracts as complete. In
practice, contracting for software development outsourcing is inevitably incomplete [3] because it typically involves unforeseen contingencies [10], noncontractible investments and behaviors [27], and immeasurable performance [11]. Bhattacharya et al. [4]
studied incomplete software outsourcing contracts
with renegotiation, but they focused on designing a renegotiation-proof contract. Benaroch et al. [2] mod-

eled the implications of including a back-sourcing renegotiation option in a software outsourcing contract
and specified the cost and value effects for the client
and the provider. We will analyze the performance of
incomplete software outsourcing contracts and investigate the impact of renegotiation on the client’s preferences for a fixed-price contract or a time-and-materials contract.
The economics literature on renegotiation is vast.
Bolton and Dewatripont [5] identified two streams: renegotiation under adverse selection and renegotiation
under moral hazard. In the former, a potential participant does not know the other party’s type before signing a contract. So contracts that are vulnerable to renegotiation tend to be less efficient in solving the asymmetric information problem between trading partners.
Contracts that require the participants to commit to not
renegotiate are better in this respect [9, 14]. In the latter, if the parties can take unilateral actions after signing a contract, then the main issue is the hold-up problem, in which the investing party fears expropriation
of the investment benefits by its contracting partner in
renegotiation, leading to underinvestment [7, 12]. Our
work belongs to the latter stream but differs from it
somewhat. Although the hold-up problem exists in
both fixed-price contract and time-and-materials contract, we will report that renegotiation may offer the
provider additional incentive to invest in making more
service-related effort.
This research also relates to the literature on software reliability. The Goel-Okumoto non-homogeneous Poisson process model is the most commonly-used
software reliability prediction model [16]. Using this
model as a starting point, Pham and Zhang [25] presented a software reliability-cost model to determine
the optimal testing time. Jiang et al. [15] separated
testing stopping time from system release time. They
considered testing as continuing during system operation, that is, post-release testing. August and
Niculescu [1] further examined the impact of software
demand on post-release testing. In addition, Jiang et al.
[16] considered both software reliability and marketrelated benefits and derived not only the optimal testing time but also the optimal number of testers. However, an implicit assumption made in all these studies
above is that the system would be developed completely. They ignored that the provider also must make
additional effort in the system development process.
As a result, we will consider both the development and
testing stages. After the provider develops the system,
the parties may renegotiate testing time before doing
this work.
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3. Model
Consider a setting in which a client outsources a
customized information system from an IT service
provider. The outsourcing services offered by the provider include three stages: system development, system testing and system maintenance. In the system development stage, the provider develops the system
based on the prototype system, and the system quality
is indicated by the number of bugs [10]. Assume the
prototype system has an initial number of bugs N0 ,
and the provider can exert effort eÎ{eL, eH} (eL<eH ) to
decrease the bugs to N = N0-e+e , where e is a uniformly-distributed random variable on [-j, j] . Since
there are always bugs that can be detected, we assume
N0-eH -j>0 . The cost of the development effort e to
the provider is ce2 , where c is the provider’s development efficiency. We assume that the development
time, which is decided on the basis of the provider’s
past experience, is constant. The random noise e will
be realized after the provider finishes system development, so the number N can be observed when system
development ends.
In the system testing stage, the provider spends
time t to detect system bugs with cost kt, and this process satisfies the properties of the Goel-Okumoto
model for software reliability, so the expected number
of undetected bugs q (t) for testing time t is:

q (t)=N exp(-lt),

(1)

where l represents the failure rate of each bug. The
cost of fixing bugs detected during testing is
a ( N -q (t) ) for the provider, where a is the cost of fixing one bug in this stage.
In the system maintenance stage, the system is delivered to the client and put into operation. The cost of
maintenance is incurred by the provider when system
failure occurs during operation. It includes the direct
cost associated with identifying and fixing the bugs,
the loss of revenue due to system downtime, and other
costs. This cost also depends on the number of undetected bugs q (t) . This is considered to be higher than
the cost of fixing the same bugs if they are detected
during the testing stage [15]. To facilitate the inclusion
of this observation, we denote the cost of maintenance
as (a+b)q (t) for the provider, where b is the added
cost per bug during maintenance compared with that
during testing.
1

On the cost side, k represents the marginal cost of testing. On
the benefit side, since ¶ ( bN exp(-lt) ) ¶t =-lbN exp(-lt) , lbN

Based on the above assumptions, the expected total cost for the provider is comprised of four parts:
(2)
C=ce2+kt+a ( N -q (t) )+(a+b)q(t) ,
From Equation 1, this also can be expressed as:
C=ce2+kt+aN +bN exp(-lt).

(3)

To exclude the unrealistic case in which testing time is
negligible, we assume l bN >k to ensure the marginal
benefit of testing is greater than its marginal cost.1
The utility of the system to the client decreases
with the total number of system bugs. Therefore, the
total utility of the client can be expressed as:
(4)
U =V -uN
where V is the baseline utility if the system is bugfree, and u is the client’s sensitivity to bugs in the system. Further, after the system is developed and uncertainty associated with e is resolved, the initial testing
time determined by the expected total number of bugs
may not be optimal. So after observing the realized N
, the client and the provider have incentives to renegotiate the initial testing time t to t! . The two parties will
split the extra social surplus increment generated by
the renegotiation, a renegotiation surplus. The shares
of the renegotiation surplus obtained by the provider
and the client are a and 1-a . Here, these also represent the relative bargaining power of the provider and
the client in renegotiation.
There are two contract types that the client can use
to initiate software outsourcing with the provider: a
fixed-price contract or a time-and-materials contract.
In a fixed-price contract, a predetermined price, FFP ,
is paid to the provider for system development, testing
and maintenance services. In a time-and-materials
contract, besides the payment for the services of the
provider, FTM , the client also must pay an extra fee for
the provider’s effort. Thus, the transfer from the client
to the provider in a time-and-materials contract is
FTM +reˆ , where eˆÎ{eL, eH} is the effort that the provider reports and r is the reward based on effort. Since
the provider’s effort level e is usually unobservable
and non-contractible, the client must resort to monitoring the provider to verify the reported effort ê . The
client’s monitoring policy f is chosen on a scale of
[0,1], which corresponds to the monitoring probability
of effort made. A higher value of f indicates that the
client will monitor a larger number of documents and
processes. Similar to Dey et al. [10], the monitoring
cost to the client depends on the monitoring policy wf

represents the marginal benefit of testing, because l N is the expected rate of bug detection by the provider at time 0 and b is the
cost saving for each bug detected by the provider [15].
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, where w captures the per unit cost of monitoring. If
the client finds that the provider has inflated his effort
level, the client will impose a cheating penalty
f(eˆ-e)+s, where (x)+ =max{0, x}. This penalty can also
be regarded as the cost of reputation loss and the subsequent future business loss.
The timing of events is as follows. At Stage 0, the
client selects contract type, and if fixed-price contract
is chosen, the client determines the contract term
{FFP}; if time-and-materials contract is chosen, the client determines contract terms {FTM , r, f}. At Stage 1,
the provider decides the effort level e as well as the
initial testing time t in a fixed-price contract, or the
effort level e input to develop the system, the reported
effort level ê and initial testing time t in a time-andmaterials contract.
At Stage 2, the system will have been developed
and the uncertainty associated with the total number of
bugs N will have been realized. The parties renegotiate the initial testing time t to a new one at t! , and
split the renegotiation surplus with the provider, thus
getting a fraction a of it.
At Stage 3, according to the renegotiated testing
time t! , the provider will detect and fix the system
bugs in the period [0, t! ]. Then, at Stage 4, the system
will be delivered to the client and the provider will offer system maintenance service.

4. Contract Analysis
We next examine the decisions of the client and the
provider under a fixed-price contract and a time-andmaterials contract with renegotiation one-at-a-time.

4.1. Fixed-Price Contract
Under a fixed-price contract, the client first determines the payment FFP for software outsourcing services at Stage 0. After observing the payment, the provider decides the initial testing time t and exerts effort e to develop the system at Stage 1. After system
development, the two parties revise the initial testing
time t to t! , and then the provider offers system testing and system maintenance services.
By backward induction, at Stage 2 the renegotiation surplus Dp can be written as:
Dp(𝑡̃) = (-k𝑡̃-bN exp(-l𝑡̃) ) – (-kt-bN exp(-lt))

2

Optimizing Equation 5 over 𝑡̃, we obtain the optimal renegotiated testing time:
(6)
t! = (1/l) ln(lbN/k)
At Stage 1, given the fixed payment FFP , the expected payoff for the provider are as follows, where
superscript FP represents fixed-price contract and subscript P represents the provider.

pPFP(e, t ; FFP)=Ee[FFP-ce2-kt +aDp
-( a+b exp(-lt) ) (N0-e+e )]

(7)

At Stage 0, anticipating the provider’s response in
effort level and initial testing time, the client determines the payment FFP to maximize its own profits as
follows. Subscript C represents the client.

pCFP(FFP)=Ee[V -u(N0-e*+e )-FFP+(1-a)Dp ]

(8)

Assume the provider’s reservation profit is 0, and
the individual rationality (IR) constraint is p PFP ³0 ,
which guarantees the minimum expected payoff of the
provider to accept the contract. Define the thresholds,
l1=k ( ln(N0 -eL)-ln(N0 -eH ) )/l(eH -eL) and l2 =k (h(eL)-h(eH ) ) 2jl(eH -eL)
, where h(e)=(N0-e+j)ln(N0-e+j)-(N0-e-j)ln(N0-e-j).
Here, the expression l2 -l1 depicts the renegotiation
surplus relative to effort. We further define a threshold
for
the provider’s bargaining power as
a H =( c(eH +eL)-a-l1 ) ( l2 -l1 ) . Then, maximizing Equations
7 and 8, we obtain:2
• Proposition 1 (Fixed-Price Contract Effort
and Testing Time) In a fixed-price contract, (i)
if 0<c£(a+l1)(eH +eL) , and (a+l1)(eH +eL)<c£(a+l2)(eH +eL),

a H <a <1 , then the optimal effort level eFP =eH and
the optimal initial testing time
tFP=ln ( lb(N0-eH )/k ) l; (ii) if c> (a+l2)(eH +eL)
and (a+l1)(eH +eL)<c£(a+l2)(eH +eL), 0<a<a H , then
eFP =eL and tFP=ln ( lb(N0-eL)/k ) l .
Proposition 1 shows that l2-l1>0 , which means that
the renegotiation surplus increases in the provider’s effort in the system development stage. Thus, in turn,
when the provider’s development efficiency is moderate and the provider has high bargaining power in renegotiation, the provider ought to be willing to exert a
high level of effort to obtain more benefit from renegotiation. In other words, renegotiation can incentivize
the provider’s effort, and as the provider’s bargaining
power increases, it is more willing to exert effort.

(5)

All modeling analysis, unless stated, is in the Appendix.
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(

)

4.2. Time-and-Materials Contract

(iv) otherwise, then tTM = 1 ln lb(N0 -eL) , eTM =eL ,

In a time-and-materials contract, the client first determines the fixed payment FTM , the per effort reward
r and the monitoring policy f . Then, the provider decides his effort level e , the reported effort level ê and
the initial testing time t . After the total number of system bugs N has been recognized, both parties renegotiate initial testing time to t! , and share the renegotiation surplus according to their relative bargaining
power. Thus, given the contract terms {FTM , r, f}, the
expected payoff for the provider, with superscript TM
representing a time-and-materials contract, is:
pPTM (e, eˆ, t ; FFP, r, f)=Ee[FTM +reˆ-f s(eˆ-e)+-ce2-kt
(9)
-( a+b exp(-lt) ) (N0-e+e )+aDp ]
Anticipating the provider’s best response, the client determines {FTM , r, f} to maximize profit via:3

and fTM =0 .

l

pCTM (FTM , r, f)=Ee[V -u(N0-e*+e )-FTM -reˆ* (10)
-wf +(1-a)Dp ]
Note that in addition to the IR constraint, p PTM ³0 ,
the client further faces incentive compatibility (IC)
constraints, pPTM (ei, eˆi, t*)³pPTM (ei, eˆj, t*) (i, j=HorL; i¹ j),
which ensure the provider is telling the truth about effort. Maximizing Equations 9 and 10, we obtain the
optimal decisions of the two parties under the timeand-materials contract in Proposition 2.
• Proposition 2 (Time-and-Materials Contract
Initial Testing Time and Monitoring Policy). In
a time-and-materials contract,
(i) if 0<w<( u-s+(1-a )(l -l ) ) (e -e ) and a+(1-a)l1+a l2
2

1

H

L

eH +eL
a+s+(1-a)l1+a l2 , then the optimal initial
<c<
eH +eL
testing time tTM =ln ( lb(N0 -eH )/k ) l , the opti-

mal effort level eTM =eH , and the optimal monitoring policy fTM =1 ;
(ii)
if
and
w³( u-s+(1-a )(l2 -l1) ) (eH -eL)
a+(1-a )l1+a l2
<c<
eH +eL

a + us(eH +eL)+( (1-a)l1+al2 ) w+s(eH -eL)l2
eH +eL
( w+s(eH -eL) ) (eH -eL)
TM
eTM =eH
t =ln ( lb(N0 -eH )/k ) l ,

,

then

,

and

( u+(1-a)(l2-l1) ) (eH -eL) ;

fTM =

w+s(eH -eL)
a
+
(1
(iii) if 0<c£ -a)l1+a l2 , then tTM = 1 ln lb(N0 -eH ) ,
l
k
eH +eL
eTM =eH , and fTM =0 ;

(

3

)

The penalty for cheating f s(eˆ-e)+ is the cost of reputation loss
and future business loss for the provider, but does not enter into the

k

Proposition 2 suggests that, apart from renegotiation, in the time-and-materials contract, the client can
stimulate the provider’s effort via monitoring. When
the increased renegotiation surplus generated by the
provider’s effort cannot cover the development cost
directly associated with the provider’s effort, the provider will exert a low level of effort to develop the system. However, meanwhile, the high level of effort may
create more profit for the client than a low level of effort will. This leads the client to incentivize the provider by implementing a policy with a high degree of
monitoring for the time-and-materials contract. On the
other hand, if the provider has high (low) development
efficiency, where it is easier (more difficult) for the
provider to improve system quality, the client’s monitoring policy fTM =0 and a time time-and-materials
contract degenerates into a fixed-price contract.

5. Contract Choice
We now examine the contract choice between
fixed-price and time-and-materials contracts for the
client. Comparing the client’s profit in the two contract
types, we offer the third proposition. We define another two thresholds for the provider’s bargaining
power, a L =( c(eH +eL)-a-s-l1 )/(l2-l1) and a M =1-us(eH -eL)/( (l2-l1)w )
+ ( w+s(eH -eL) )( c(eH +eL)-a-l2 )/( (l2 -l1)w ) , and a threshold
for
the
per
unit
cost
of
monitoring,
wˆ =( u+a+l2 -c(eH +eL) ) (eH -eL) .
• Proposition 3 (Testing Time Renegotiation
Contract Choice). When testing time renegotiation is considered, the client will choose a timeand-materials contract over a fixed-price contract if 0<w<w
ˆ, max{0, a L}<a < min{a H, 1}, or if

w³wˆ, max{0, a M}<a <min{a H, 1} ; otherwise, a
fixed-price contract will be preferred.
Figure 1 illustrates the results of Proposition 3.
When the provider has high bargaining power, as in
Region I, renegotiation incentivizes the provider’s effort and weakens the effect of monitoring in stimulating the provider’s effort, which leads the client to
choose a fixed-price contract. When the provider has
low bargaining power and the per unit cost of monitoring is low, as in Region II, the effect of renegotiation
for incentivizing the provider’s effort is more limited.
Thus, to obtain more benefit from renegotiation, the
client’s profit function, since it is not an earnings benefit that the
client gets in practice [10].
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client will use monitoring as a complement to incentivize the provider’s effort and a time-and-materials
contract will become the preferred choice.

Figure 1. Client’s Contract Choice

In Region III, when the provider has low bargaining power and the per unit cost of monitoring is high,
at a L<a <a M and w³wˆ , again the beneficial effect of
renegotiation to incentivize the provider’s effort will
be limited. Thus, to achieve more benefit from renegotiation, the client will reward a high value for r to
the provider to incentivize the provider’s effort. However, high value of r will lead to a high degree of monitoring with a high monitoring cost for the implementation of that policy. This reduces the benefit of monitoring, resulting in a different conclusion: a fixed-price
contract is better than a time-and-materials contract.
Also 0<a <a L equals c³( a+s+(1-a)l1+a l2 )/(eH +eL) ,
which means that the provider’s development efficiency is low. Thus, the provider will be reluctant to
make an effort due to the high cost of development,
and both renegotiation and monitoring cannot incentivize the provider’s effort. Meanwhile, a time-andmaterials contract will degenerate into a fixed-price
contract and the client will select the latter contract.

6. Conclusion
We established a multi-stage model where a client
outsources a customized information system from a
provider, and examined fixed-price and time-and-materials contracts. We focused on the impacts of testing
time renegotiation on the client’s preference for the
contract types. Our analysis showed that compared
with a fixed-price contract, a time-and-materials contract stimulates the provider’s effort better due to monitoring. In both contracts, renegotiation can incentivize
the provider’s effort. As the provider’s bargaining

power in renegotiation increases, the provider is more
willing to exert effort to develop the system. When the
provider has high bargaining power, renegotiation offers a greater incentive and the client will prefer a
fixed-price contract. When the provider has low bargaining power and the per unit cost of monitoring is
low, however, the client will use monitoring to stimulate the provider and will choose a time-and-materials
contract. And when the provider has low bargaining
power and the per unit cost of monitoring is high, renegotiation leads to high monitoring cost, which
causes the client to prefer a fixed-price contract.
Though research on software outsourcing contracts
with renegotiation is in a nascent stage [2], there are a
number of avenues that can be addressed by future research. To begin with, we assumed that renegotiation
is costless. Future research should explore how renegotiation cost affects the client’s contract choice. Next,
it is of particular interest to investigate the impact of
renegotiation on the value of information. Since the
client can observe the performance of effort and renegotiate the initial contract ex post, the value of information will decrease. However, there is a possibility
that the value of information will increase. This is because it can amplify the effect that the provider’s private information reduces the client’s profit, while renegotiation can increase the total surplus. Last, if there
are two or more potential providers, then it is also interesting to study the effect of competition on the contract with renegotiation. This mimics real software
outsourcing and has contract choice implications.

Appendix A1. Fixed-Price Contract
From Eqs. 5 and 6, Eqs. 7 and 8 can be written as:
h(e)
p PFP(e, t ; FFP)=FFP -a(N0-e)-ce2-a k ln(lb)+
l
k 2j (A1)
-(1-a) ( kt +b(N0 -e)exp(-lt) )
(1-a)k
h(e*)
pCFP(FFP)=V -u(N0-e*)-FFP ln(lb)+
l
k 2j (A2)
+(1-a) ( kt*+b(N0-e*)exp(-lt*) )
In Eq. A1, tFP is determined by FOC ¶p PFP /¶t =0 . Then

(

(

(

)

)

)

substituting tFP = 1 ln lb(N0 -e) into Equation A1 and coml
k
paring the value of p PFP(eH ) and p PFP(eL) , the optimal decisions for the provider can be derived. Next in Eq. A2, when
the IR constraint binds, the client has maximal profit. So,
h(eFP)
FFP =a(N0 -eFP)+ceFP2 +a k ln(lb)+
+
l
k
2j
(1-a ) ( ktFP +b(N0 -eFP)exp(-lt FP) ) .

(

)

We next define the function: f (e)=h(e)-ln(N0 -e). By the
2j
Hadamard inequality, we have

1 j
1 de > 1 ,
2j ò-j N0-e+e
N0-e
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where

j

ò j N -1e+e de =ln(N -e+j)-ln(N -e-j). Therefore,
-

0

0

0

¶f (e) 1
=
- 1 ( ln(N0 -e+j)-ln(N0-e-j) ) < 0 . And then,
¶e N0 -e 2j
f (eL)- f (eH )>0 , which suggests that l2 -l1>0 .

Appendix A2. Time-and-Materials Contract
From Eqs. 5 and 6, Eqs. 9 and 10 can be written as:
p (e, eˆ, t ; FTM , r, f)=FTM +reˆ-f s(eˆ-e)+ -a(N0 -e)-ce2
(A3)
-(1-a ) ( kt +b(N0 -e)exp(-lt) )
h(e)
a
k
l
b
ln( )+
l
k 2j
(1-a )k
h(e*)
pCTM (FTM , r, f)=V -u(N0-e*)-FTM -reˆ*ln(lb)+
l
k 2j (A4)
+(1-a) ( kt*+b(N0-e*)exp(-lt*) )-wf
First, the IC constraints should be satisfied, because the
client prefers to deter the developer from cheating. Thus, the
client offers an incentive compatible contract with r£f s . In
Eq. A3, due to the constraints r£f s , we have eˆTM =eTM . tTM
is determined by the first-order condition ¶p PTM /¶t =0 . Then
TM
P

(

)

(

(

)

)

substituting ê=e and tTM = 1 ln lb(N0 -e) into Eq. A3 and
l
k
comparing the value of p PTM (eH ) and p PTM (eL) , the optimal
decision for the provider can be derived. Next in Equation
A4, the IR constraint is binding, so then we have the optimal
payment FTM . The constraint (IC-L) is binding so that
is
observed.
And
substituting
rTM =fTM s
TM
TM
TM
TM
TM
into
Eq.
A4,
we
have:
(F , r , e(f) , eˆ , t )
h ( e(f)TM ) ö (A5).
2j ÷ø

max pCTM =V -(u+a) ( N0-e(f)TM )-ce(f)TM 2 -wf - k æç ln(lb)+
f
lè k

Solving Eq. A5, the optimal decisions for the client in a
time-and-materials contract then can be derived.
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